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I.

JOHN ROBERTS JR. AND THE ELEGANT ART OF
FORESHADOWING

With his hair swept neatly to the side, his soft blue eyes
gleamed up at the Senate Judiciary Committee. 1 John Glover

* Juris Doctor Candidate, 2016, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago,
Illinois; B.A. in Criminal Justice, 2013, Johnson & Wales University,
Providence, Rhode Island. I want to thank my girlfriend, Emily Forsythe for
her continuing and unyielding support throughout law school. There is a
special place in heaven for law students’ significant others and an even more
exclusive place in hell for students who discount their godsends. I am also
grateful to my editors Blythe Milby for constantly encouraging me and Tyler
Duff for molding my snark into tasteful dissent. Inherent credits are due to
Prof. Samuel Olken for emboldening me to critically analyze even the most
astute juris’ legal analyses. Last but not least, I’d be remiss if I did not thank
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Roberts Jr. then proudly stated, “Judges are like umpires,” and
added that it was his “job to call balls and strikes and not to bat.” 2
Yet, Roberts failed to mention that just as umpires’ strike zones
may differ, judges certainly determine what does and does not fit
within their subjective zone of constitutional conformity. When
this reality plays out in our nation’s courts, the results yield
lasting ramifications on people’s lives.
Roberts’s decisions made from the bench have called into
doubt his confirmation hearing proclamation that he does not have
an agenda. 3 Specifically in Shelby County v. Holder,4 Roberts’s
majority opinion struck down 5 a key provision of “the most
effective civil rights law ever enacted.”6 Roberts cited a
“fundamental principle[,]” equal state sovereignty, as the
foundation supporting his majority opinion. 7 The goal of this
comment is to demonstrate that this doctrine is unsupported by
the Court’s jurisprudence and yields profoundly dangerous
consequences. 8 Specifically, Shelby County opens the door to new
forms of voting discrimination all for the sake of protecting
equality amongst the states. 9
This comment addresses the inability of the Supreme Court,
and in particular Chief Justice Roberts to appreciate the
contemporary role that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 10 (VRA)
my dad whose work ethic I attempt to emulate every day and my mom who
taught me to read and write.
1. Roberts Confirmation Hearing, Day 1 (C-SPAN television broadcast Sept.
12, 2005), www.c-span.org/video/?188437-1/roberts-confirmation-hearing-day-1.
2. Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be
Chief Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary , 109th
Cong. 55-56 (2005) (statement of John G. Roberts, Jr., Nominee to be chief
justice of the United States).
3. Id. at 56 (stating to the chairman that he (Roberts) came “before the
committee with no agenda”).
4. Shelby Cty., Ala. v. Holder (Shelby County), 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013).
5. Id. at 2632 (holding the Voting Rights Act of 1965, § 4(b)’s, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1973b(b) (2006), preclearance coverage formula that determined which
states and other jurisdictions were subject to federal preclearance
unconstitutional).
6. THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE , History of the VRA, www.civilrights.org/
voting-rights/vra/history.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2014) (stating that when
President Lyndon B. Johnson signed the VRA into law, it was “hailed by many
as the most effective civil rights law ever enacted”).
7. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2622 (citing Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist.
No. One v. Holder (Northwest Austin), 557 U.S. 193, 203 (2009).
8. The chief justice first references the concept of equal state sovereignty in
Northwest Austin. See Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 203 (stating the VRA
“differentiates between the States, despite our historic tradition that all States
enjoy ‘equal sovereignty’”). As the following sections will discuss, equal state
sovereignty lacks precedential support.
9. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2618 (holding Section 4(b)’s coverage
formula violated “the principle that all States enjoy equal sovereignty”).
10. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (formally 42 U.S.C. § 1973). If a jurisdiction was
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continued to play in society, as well as where sovereignty truly lies
in the American constitutional system. Part II of this comment
discusses the unavoidable history of discrimination in voting
rights and the duty imposed upon the federal government to
prevent such discrimination. Part II also presents a history of
Roberts’s previous views on the VRA expressed long before Shelby
County. Part III analyzes the Shelby County decision in detail and
compares it to other instances where the chief justice has
overlooked the nation’s history of racism and the effects it
continues to play today. Finally, part IV proposes how Roberts
should have decided Shelby County and how Congress can remedy
Roberts’s untenable holding.

II. A REPULSIVE PAST I S BEST LEFT UNFORGOTTEN
The road that led to Voting Rights Act of 1965 was long and
tortuous. And that history did not end once the VRA was signed.
This section revisits this history, while detailing important
patterns that continue to persist today, albeit it in less appalling
shades. Specifically, this section details the provisions of the VRA,
their evolution, and their essential operation even in today’s more
tolerant voting atmosphere. Finally, this section will touch upon
Roberts’s long battle against the VRA and his early dismissive
opinions of it.

A. A War Was Won, but a Battle Had Just Begun
At the close of the Civil War, Congress passed three
amendments to the Constitution with the hopes of preventing
“Southerners from re-establishing white supremacy.”11 The
Thirteenth
Amendment
ended
slavery, 12 the Fourteenth
Amendment guaranteed due process of law and equal protection
under the law, 13 and the Fifteenth Amendment prohibited the
denial of the right to vote “on account of race, color or previous
condition of servitude.”14 The Fifteenth Amendment also expressly
covered by Section 4(b)’s coverage formula it would have to obtain federal
approval, also referred to as “preclearance,” before changing its election laws.
52 U.S.C. §§ 10303(b), 10304(a) (formally 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973b(b), 1973c).
11. CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS FOUNDATION, Race and Voting in the
Segregated South, www.crf-usa.org/brown-v-board-50th-anniversary/race-andvoting.html. (last visited Apr. 20, 2016).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1 (“Neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States”).
13. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“Nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”).
14. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1 ( “The right of citizens of the United States
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gave Congress the “power to enforce [the] article by appropriate
legislation.”15
Though the Fifteenth Amendment explicitly prohibits denying
or abridging the right to vote because of race, it was not selfexecuting. 16 To strengthen the effect of the Fifteenth Amendment,
Congress passed the Enforcement Act in 1870, 17 and expanded it
by amendment in 1871. 18 These Acts made a variety of racially
motivated discriminatory actions federal offenses. 19 The 1871
provisions mandated that federal officials supervise federal
elections and voting registrations. 20 These officials, who were
appointed by federal judges, were to protect the honesty of
precincts’ rolls, ensure that elections were properly conducted, and
guarantee that votes were tallied correctly. 21
Federal enforcement of these Acts was vital to protect the
rights of the newly enfranchised. 22 If implemented and carried out
properly, the Acts would stop nonwhite voters from being turned
away from the polls and punish those who retaliated with violence
against them. 23 Despite the empowering results of these Acts for
black voters,24 the Acts were constantly under ferocious attack by
southern whites. 25 Though the Civil War was over and the

to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”).
15. Id. at § 2 (“The Congress shall have the power to enforce this article
[U.S. CONST. amend. XV] by appropriate legislation”).
16. See MELVIN I. UROFSKY & PAUL FINKELMAN, A MARCH OF LIBERTY 501
(3d ed. 2011) (stating that “neither the Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth
Amendments created a positive right to vote”).
17. Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 140 (1870).
18. Enforcement Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (1871).
19. See Armand Derfner, Racial Discrimination and the Right to Vote, 26
VAND. L. REV . 523, 526 (1973) (stating sections 4 and 5 of the Act criminalized
“[t]he use of force, bribery, threats, economic pressure, or ‘other unlawful
means’ to interfere with or obstruct any citizen’s right to be free of racial
discrimination in voting”).
20. Id. at 527.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 530.
23. Early, the federal government vigorously enforced the Acts,
prosecuting 1,271 in the South and appropriating $3.2 million for election
supervision under the 1871 Act. Id. Soon after, however, federal enforcement
was less active and effective discrimination reinstated itself as the societal
norm. Id.
24. Twenty-two blacks were elected as State Congressmen during
Reconstruction. JOHN FRANKLIN, FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM 317-23 (3d ed.
1969). See also Race and Voting in the Segregated South, supra note 11
(explaining that from 1870 to 1880, Mississippi sent two black senators to
Washington, while electing a black lieutenant governor).
25. See Anthony J. Gaughan, Has the South Changed? Shelby County and
the Expansion of the Voter ID Battlefield, 19 TEX. J. ON C. L. & C. R. 109, 114
(2013) (explaining the federal government’s difficulties with enforcing the
Fifteenth Amendment).
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Constitution forbid the right to vote be denied because of race, 26
southern states did not sheath their weapons at the close of war. 27
Instead, blacks living in the South faced constant threat of
violence when they attempted to participate in the political
process. 28
To preserve the power recently lost with the passage of the
Civil War Amendments, white supremacist organizations, such as
the Ku Klux Klan (KKK), employed brutal violence to intimidate
black Republicans from exercising their right to vote. 29 In 1873,
seventy-one black Republicans were murdered by white Democrats
over a disputed county election. 30 This atrocity, known as The
Colfax Massacre, and the court battles that followed, only
underscored the difficulties associated with enforcing the
Enforcement Acts.
Those convicted for their roles in The Colfax Massacre
appealed the Enforcement Acts’ constitutionality. In United States
v. Cruikshank, the Supreme Court held that the federal
indictments charging several participants of the mob failed to
state an offense. 31 The Court reasoned that the rights and
privileges the violent conspiracy aimed to deprive were not federal
rights, because the mob was responding to a disputed state
election. 32 Congress could only protect the rights associated with
voting when exercised during federal elections. 33 Since this mob
erupted following a state election, the Court held that a
deprivation of a federal right was not alleged; therefore, the
indictments did not state an appropriate offense. 34

26. U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
27. See WILLIAM G ILLETTE , RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUCTION, 1869-1879
115-16 (1982) (detailing specific acts of violence carried out by whites in
response to blacks exercising their right to vote).
28. Id. See also ALEXANDER K EYSSAR, THE RIGHT TO VOTE : THE
CONTESTED HISTORY OF DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES 106 (rev. ed.
2009) (stating that white supremacists “sought to drive the Republicans [who
supported Reconstruction efforts] from power and elect Democrats”).
29. See Gaughan, supra note 25, at 114 (explaining that during
Reconstruction the majority of blacks were Republican, while the majority of
whites were Democrats and “viewed African-American civil rights as a dual
threat to the region’s white supremacist racial order and its Democratdominated political order”).
30. Details regarding The Colfax Massacre are described in H OMER
CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND, FEDERAL JUSTICE 241-44 (1937).
31. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 556-57 (1875).
32. Id. at 556 (stating “[t]here is nothing to show that the elections voted at
were any other than State elections”).
33. See id. (clarifying that the federal government does not “have the
power or [is] required to do mere police duly in the States”).
34. See id. (stating that “[t]he charge as made is really of nothing more
than a conspiracy to commit a breach of the peace within a State”).
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Violence was not the only tool used by southerners to abridge
the right to vote during Reconstruction. 35 Whites in the South also
waged relentless campaigns of fraud and disenfranchisement to
protect Democrat strongholds at the state level. 36 These campaigns
helped Democratic majorities pass additional discriminatory
schemes such as poll taxes and literacy tests, designed to weaken
the influence of black votes. 37
1.

One Step Forward, Now Turn Around and Keep Walking:
The End of Reconstruction

It was clear that the principle of the Fifteenth Amendment
was hardly assured, let alone realized, through the Enforcement
Acts. The Supreme Court refused to alleviate the quandary, and
instead routinely fashioned holdings nullifying Congress’s
Reconstruction statutes.38 Despite the South’s often violent
growing pains, many Americans and their political representatives
were quick to point to the region’s progress. 39 The problem was
solved in then Congressman and future President James A.
Garfield’s mind when he declared that “[t]he Fifteenth
Amendment confers upon the African race the care of its own
destiny . . . [I]t places their fortunes in their own hands.” 40

35. See Gaughan, supra note 25, at 114 (explaining the additional
nonviolent means employed by southern whites to prevent blacks from voting).
36. Democrats generally sympathized with white supremacists. See id.
(stating that election fraud and disenfranchisement subverted the democratic
process and “ensur[ed] Democratic control over the region’s political order”).
37. Id. (stating “Confederate states enacted poll taxes, literacy tests, and
other fraudulent election laws specifically designed to disenfranchise black
voters and keep the Republican Party out of the South”). See also MICHAEL
PERMAN, STRUGGLE FOR MASTERY: DISFRANCHISEMENT IN THE SOUTH, 18881908 1-2 (2001) (stating that “each state in the former Confederacy set in
motion complicated and hazardous electoral movements aimed at removing
large numbers of its eligible voters”).
38. See United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876) (holding section 3 and 4,
of the Enforcement Act void). See also The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36
(1872) (applying a restrictive interpretation of Reconstruction legislation and
Civil War Amendments); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874) (narrowing
the scope of the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment). See also UROFSKY & FINKELMAN, supra note 16, at 550 (stating
“The victories of 1861 to 1870 for civil rights and equality had been u ndone by
four decades of jurisprudence”).
39. See Joel Heller, Shelby County and the End of History , 44 U. MEM . L.
REV . 357, 365 (2013) (stating “[d]espite the record of continued discrimination,
a number of Northern officials and commentators expressed the belief that
federal intervention to protect voting rights in the South was no longer
necessary”).
40. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION,
1863-1877, 8518-19 (2013) (ebook) (quoting Garfield).
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Republicans further exemplified northern exhaustion when
they agreed to withdraw federal troops from the South and end
Reconstruction in exchange for Democrats’ conceding the 1876
presidential election. 41 In the following years, Northern exhaustion
with maintaining the Enforcement Acts in the South, coupled with
Democrats regaining control in Congress42 deteriorated any
progress gained during Reconstruction.43 Reconstruction efforts
waned further when Congress failed to enact the Federal Election
Bill of 1890.44 The Bill would have authorized federal officials to
overturn the results of elections certified by state officials. 45
Congress then repealed many of the Enforcement Acts provisions
in 1894 and 1909. 46 Many attributed the decline of Reconstruction
to the progressive enlightenment in the South. 47 But any
enlightenment would prove short-lived; the absence of any federal
intervention opened the door for the South to eradicate the modest
gains of Reconstruction and to reinstate white supremacy in
voting. 48
At the turn of the century, any gains of Reconstruction were
drowned by the reemergence of facially neutral, but wholly
discriminatory policies. 49 Though poll taxes, literacy tests, 50
property qualifications, and criminal exclusion laws were born in

41. Heller, supra note 39, at 365 (explaining “Republicans in Congress
reputedly agreed to end Reconstruction and to restore ‘home rule’ to the South
if Democrats would concede that Republican Rutherford Hayes had won the
[1876 presidential] election”).
42. Republicans lost their majority congressional control in 1875. Derfner,
supra note 19, at 529.
43. See K EYSSAR, supra note 28, at 88 (stating “[w]hatever the Fourteenth
and Fifteenth Amendments said on paper, the right to vote was back in the
hands of the states” and Congress did not “seriously consider federal
intervention in southern politics” until the 1960s).
44. Id.
45. See Heller, supra note 39, at 365 (stating that even congressional
supporters “did not view the bill as a high priority”). See also K EYSSAR, supra
note 28, at 88 (explaining that Congress “signaled to the South that the
federal government was not prepared to act energetically to guarantee the
voting rights of blacks” when it failed to pass the Federal Election Bill).
46. Act of February 8, 1894, ch. 25, 28 Stat. 36 (1894); Act of March 4,
1909, ch. 321, 35 Stat. 1088 (1909). See also H.R. REP. No. 53-19, at 7 (1893)
(stating “[l]et every trace of reconstruction measures be wiped from the statute
books; let the States of this great Union understand that the elections are in
their own hands”).
47. See FONER, supra note 40, at 8519 (quoting an Illinois newspaper that
stated “the negro is now a voter and a citizen”).
48. See id. at 8000 (stating that “[t]he threat of federal intervention
restrained the most extreme proposals” of Southern policies preventing blacks
from exercising their right to vote).
49. Heller, supra note 39, at 366-67.
50. Literacy tests required applicants to read and write any section of the
State or U.S. Constitutions. Derfner, supra note 19, at 537.
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the 1870s, they thrived during the early 1900s. 51 Moreover, federal
apathy exacerbated their presence and effects. 52 For instance, in
1901, the Alabama legislature reenacted criminal–exclusion laws,
citing specific crimes it believed blacks were more likely to commit
than whites. 53 Southern states also combatted fears that literacy
tests would have the effect of disenfranchising white voters. Many
southern
states
incorporated
“understanding”
tests
and
“grandfather clauses”54 that eliminated honest application of the
literacy tests. 55 These polices were associated with elastic
standards that would snap in the face of blacks but not whites. 56
States also attempted to weaken black voting power through
gerrymandering57 and all-white primaries. 58 These policies caused
minority registration and voting rates to free-fall. 59 Between 1896
and 1904 black voter turnout in the South that once reached 60 to
85 percent fell to single digits. 60
The successful discriminatory practices enacted at the turn of
the century continued throughout the ensuing decades. 61 Attempts
to combat these policies through litigation proved difficult, and
any victories for black voters would only have temporary effect. 62 A
pattern emerged: every time that voting rights advocates
succeeded in overturning a discriminatory policy, the state would
soon enact a new policy with a different name, but identical
51. See Heller, supra note 39, at 366-67 (explaining the increased
effectiveness and presence of voter discrimination laws in the South during
the early 1900s).
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Grandfather clauses exempted voters whose ancestors could vote in the
1860s from literacy tests. Id. at 366.
55. Id.
56. See Derfner, supra note 19, at 537-38 (explaining the tests were not to
be applied equally: “[t]here was a general understanding the interpretation of
the Constitution offered by an illiterate white man would be acceptable to the
registrars; that of a Negro would not”). See also Heller, supra note 39, at 366
(stating that the requirement that voters “read and understand a text was
frequently applied stringently to black voters and forgivingly to whites”).
57. Heller, supra note 39, at 366 (explaining states would engage in
gerrymandering to “dilute whatever black vote remained”).
58. See Derfner, supra note 19, at 538 (stating that “no doubt then existed
that political parties were private organizations outside the purview of the
fourteenth or fifteenth amendments”).
59. K EYSSAR, supra note 28, at 91 (stating that black registration in
Louisiana dropped ninety-nine percent from 1896 to 1904).
60. Heller, supra note 39, at 367.
61. Id. (explaining seven of the eleven ex-confederate states maintained
literacy tests, Louisiana enacted an arbitrary good character requirement,
while Alabama required white citizens to vouch for blacks before blacks were
allowed to register).
62. See LAURENCE TRIBE & JOSHUA MATZ, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE , THE
ROBERTS COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 33 (2014) (stating “every
[discriminatory] law struck down was replaced by one, two or three more”).
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effect. 63 With these frustrating schemes manipulating every
election, Congress was compelled to act, and approached the
problem from a different angle.
2.

Congress Takes a Stand: The Birth of the Voting Rights
Act

Although Congress enacted three statutes in 1957, 1960, and
1964 in an effort to quell the rampant discrimination in voting, 64
not one of the three acts overcame the obstacles blocking voting
equality in the South. 65 In March 1965, Attorney General
Katzenbach declared that the “[e]xisting law is inadequate . . .
even in those jurisdictions where judgment is finally won, local
officials intent upon evading the spirit of the law are adept at
devising new discriminatory techniques not covered by the letter of
the judgment.”66 The fourth time would prove to be the charm.
In 1965, almost an entire century after the Fifteenth
Amendment was passed, 67 Congress finally acted to address
southern states’ continuous violations of the Constitution. 68

63. This tactic is seen via white-only Texas primaries through the following
three cases: Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953) (holding unconstitutional a
policy that instituted a three step exclusion process upon pre -primaries, the
primary, and the general election); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944)
(holding a resolution that limited voting to only whites was unconstitutional);
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927) (finding a statute that prohibited
blacks from voting in Democratic primary unconstitutional).
64. The Civil Rights Act of 1957, 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1957) (current version
at 52 U.S.C. § 10101); The Civil Rights Act of 1960, 74 Stat. 86 (1960); and The
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 241 (1964).
65. See Sherry A. Swirsky, Minority Voter Intimidation: The Problem That
Won’t Go Away, 11. TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV . 359, 370-71 (2002) (explaining
courts reached inconsistent conclusions when faced with claims arising out the
Civil Rights Act of 1957); U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM ’N, REPORT 133 (1959)
(declaring “[a]gainst the prejudice of registrars and jurors, the U.S.
Government appears under present laws to be helpless to make good
guarantees of the Constitution”). See also U.S. CIVIL RIGHTS COMM ’N, JUSTICE
REPORT 136 (1961) (concluding “broader measures are required if denials of
constitutional rights [in voting] are to be quickly eliminated.”); Warren M.
Christopher, The Constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, 18 STAN.
L. REV . 1, 7 (1965) (stating the 1964 Amendments “did not remove the serious
obstacles to effective protection of voting rights”).
66. Hearings on Voting Rights Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th
Cong. 13 (1965) (statement of Att’y Gen. Katzenbach).
67. The first century of the Fifteenth Amendment “can only be regarded as
a failure.” Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 198.
68. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2618 (stating the VRA was enacted “to
address entrenched racial discrimination in voting”). See also South Carolina
v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 309 (1966), abrogated by Shelby County, 133 S.
Ct. 2612 (stating in enacting the VRA, Congress was “confronted by an
insidious and pervasive evil which had been perpetuated in certain parts of
our country through unremitting and ingenious defiance of the Constitution”).
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Congress concluded that its previously unsuccessful attempts 69 to
address voting rights must “be replaced by sterner and more
elaborate measures in order to satisfy the clear commands of the
Fifteenth Amendment.”70 In addressing these failures, Congress
passed the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which incorporated a
comprehensive strategy to prevent the injustice that had plagued
the previous century from ever resurfacing. 71
Section 2 of the Act outlawed the “denial or abridgement of
the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of
race or color.”72 The section also gave the attorney general and
private individuals the right to file suit in federal court to block
the implementation of discriminatory election laws.73 The VRA
also expressly prohibited poll taxes, literacy tests, and other
previously implemented policies that had been used to deny blacks
the right to vote. 74 Theses sections applied to every state. 75
Though each section of the VRA was powerful in its own
right, the pillars assuring the Act’s success were Section 4(b)’s
coverage
formula
and
Section
5’s
federal preclearance
requirement. 76 The two sections operated in tandem. The coverage
formula covered any jurisdiction which maintained any
discriminatory “test or device” and had less than 50 percent of its
eligible minority voters registered for the 1964 presidential
election. 77 Most of the jurisdictions covered by the formula were
located in the South: Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi,

69. Though Congress wrote the law, President Lyndon Johnson deserves
praise as well. Pleading for Congress to act, the president stated, “Should we
defeat every enemy, should we double our wealth and conquer the stars, and
still be unequal to this issue then we will have failed as a people and as a
nation.” Lyndon B. Johnson, U.S. Pres., Special Message to the Congress: The
American Promise, Address Before the United States Congress (Mar. 15,
1965), in MILLER CENTER, http://millercenter.org/president/speeches/speech3386.
70. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 309 (detailing the points that emerged from
the legislative history of the Act contained in the committee hearings and
debates).
71. 52 U.S.C. § 10301 (formally 42 U.S.C. § 1973). See THE LEADERSHIP
CONFERENCE , supra note 6 (explaining the VRA was designed to and
incorporated a scheme that overcome the inefficiencies of previous failed
legislation).
72. 52 U.S.C § 10301(a) (formally 42 U.S.C. § 1973a).
73. 52 U.S.C. § 10302 (formally 42 U.S.C. § 1973a).
74. 52 U.S.C. §§ 10306 (poll taxes), 10501 (literacy tests and other
discriminatory devices) (formally 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973h, 1973a( a)).
75. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(a).
76. The phrase “preclearance” can also be understood as prior approval.
Section 5 acted as a firewall and prevented local officials from putting laws
into effect before litigation could strike them down. See TRIBE & MATZ, supra
note 62, at 33 (stating the preclearance rule “prevent[ed] local officials from
outmaneuvering civil rights litigation”).
77. 52 U.S.C. § 10303(b) (formally 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(b)).
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South Carolina, Virginia, and part of North Carolina. 78 If a
jurisdiction was covered by Section 4(b)’s coverage formula, it had
to obtain prior federal approval, commonly referred to as
“preclearance,” under Section 5 before making any changes to its
voting procedures. 79
The success of the coverage formula and preclearance was
immediate. In Mississippi, black registration rose from 7 to 60
percent two years after the formula was implemented. 80 But not
everyone was thrilled with this progress. 81 The VRA was operating
effectively, but those who despised its effect—the enfranchisement
of minorities—attempted to attack the VRA’s constitutionality. 82
A year after the VRA’s adoption, South Carolina challenged
the law’s constitutionality in South Carolina v. Katzenbach. 83 In
the case, Carolina argued that the VRA violated state equality by
singling out certain states for special federal oversight. 84 Five
states joined South Carolina and wrote amicus briefs expressing
the same disdain. 85 The scorn expressed towards the VRA had a
definitive southern twang—no northern state wrote in
opposition. 86
South Carolina and the other southern states argued that the
VRA violated the nation’s federalist system, unnecessarily
infringing on the rights of the states. 87 The Supreme Court
rejected South Carolina’s argument, refused to ignore history, and
declared that “exceptional conditions can justify legislative
measures not otherwise appropriate.”88 In the 8–1 decision, the

78. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 318. The formula also covered counties in
Arizona, Idaho, and Hawaii. Id.
79. 52 U.S.C. § 10304(a) (formally 42 U.S.C. § 1973c). Derfner, supra note
19, at 550.
80. See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 62, at 32-33, (stating “[f]ive years after
the VRA was passed nearly as many blacks registered to vote in Geor gia,
Alabama, Louisiana, North Carolina, Mississippi, and South Carolina as the
entire century before 1965”). See also Race and Voting in the Segregated
South, supra note 11 (stating, “Registration of black voters in the South
jumped from 43 percent in 1964 to 66 percent by the end of the decade . . . an
increase of more than a million [new voters].”).
81. See Jim Rutenberg, A Dream Undone, N.Y TIMES , July 29, 2015,
www.nytimes.com/2015/07/29/magazine/voting-rights-act-dreamundone.html?nlid=64827106&_r=1 (detailing southern politicians’ resentment
to Section 5).
82. See generally, Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 301 (South Carolina arguing the
Voting Rights Act is unconstitutional.).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 323.
85. Gaughan, supra note 25, at 117.
86. Id.
87. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 at 334 (explaining South Carolina contends
the VRA is an uncommon exercise of congressional power).
88. Id. The Court also recognized that “Congress knew that some of the
States covered by [the coverage formula] had resorted to extr aordinary
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Court held the coverage formula was “rational in both practice and
theory.”89
Not every justice was so persuaded by the covered states’
palpably prejudicial history. Justice Hugo Black, alone in dissent,
saw the VRA as a divergence from the nation’s constitutional
structure. 90 The former member of the Ku Klux Klan 91 argued the
VRA allowed the federal government to treat the states as
“conquered provinces.”92 He also contended that the federal
government should keep in line with the tradition of filing suits
against state officials once a state law created an actual case and
controversy. 93 Although Justice Black’s arguments were soundly
rejected in 1966, that same contempt for the coverage formula and
preclearance requirement persisted for decades until finally
accepted in 2013. 94
3.

The Scaling Back of the VRA

Even though the South experienced immense progress in
voting equality following the signing of the VRA, continued
operation of the Act’s provisions was not guaranteed. Section 5’s
preclearance requirement was set to expire after five years. 95 In
1970, Congress addressed this sunset clause by expanding the
coverage formula to include jurisdictions that maintained
discriminatory tests or devices and experienced less than 50
percent minority voter registration or turnout in 1968. 96 Five years
later, Congress did the same thing, but changed the date from
1968 to 1972. 97 Those jurisdictions covered by the 1964 formula
remained covered. 98 Though the VRA’s preclearance formula was
stratagem of contriving new rules of various kinds for the sole purpose of
perpetuating voting discrimination in the face of adverse federal court
decrees.” Id. at 335.
89. Id. at 330 (stating that the use of “[t]ests and devices [were] relevant to
voting discrimination because of their long history as a tool for perpetrating
the evil” and “a low voting turnout was pertinent for obvious reasons.”).
90. See id. at 358 (Black, J., dissenting) (stating the fact that the VRA
compels states “to beg federal authorities to approve their policies, so distorts
our constitutional structure of government as to render any distinction drawn
in the Constitution between state and federal power almost meaningless”).
91. Hugo Black, BIO., www.biography.com/people/hugo-black-37030 (last
visited Apr. 20, 2016). Justice Black joined the KKK in the early 1920s and
resigned after two years. Id.
92. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 360 (Black, J., dissenting).
93. Id. at 357.
94. See Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2631 (agreeing with Shelby County
that the coverage formula is an unconstitutional exercise of power by the
federal government on the states).
95. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 330.
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
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still intact, other provisions of the Act were undermined by way of
judicial interpretation.
In 1980, the Supreme Court dealt significant setback to
Section 2 of the VRA in City of Mobile v. Bolden. 99 Prior to Bolden,
some courts required individuals suing a jurisdiction because of its
voting policy to satisfy a high burden and show that the voting
policy was motivated by a discriminatory purpose or intent. 100
Other courts, however, were more deferential to plaintiffs and only
required them to show that the state’s scheme resulted in a
discriminatory effect. 101 In Bolden, the Court resolved these
inconsistencies. In a plurality opinion, the Court held that for a
scheme to be unlawful, it had to be fueled by purposeful
discrimination. 102 Purposeful discrimination was a much higher
burden for plaintiffs to overcome. 103
Plaintiffs, however, would not be required to overcome such a
burden for long. In 1982, Congress reassessed the VRA and
upended the Bolden ruling. 104 During the effects/intent debates,
John Roberts—at the time an advisor to then–Attorney General
William French Smith—aggressively opposed the effects based
standard. 105 Roberts wrote several memoranda that attacked the
VRA. In his writings, he argued the “widely accepted practices”
used by states should not be subject to attack in federal courts. 106
In other memoranda, Roberts contended that Congress’s effects
99. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980).
100. The phrases “intent” and “purpose” are used interchangeably. See
Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U.S. 124, 149 (1971) (holding policies must be
“conceived or [operate] as purposeful devices to further racial or economic
discrimination”).
101. The phrases “effects” and “results” are also used interchangeably. See
Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 88 (1966) (holding that merely requiring
plaintiffs to show the schemes produces invidious effects or results).
102. See Bolden, 446 U.S. at 74 (holding the city of Mobile’s voting policies
did not violate Section 2 because the plaintiff’s evidenced was “far from proof
that the at-large electoral scheme represent[ed] purposeful discrimination
against Negro voters”).
103. See id. at 134-35 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that “a standard
based solely upon motives . . . creates significant problems of proof for
plaintiffs” and that the intent standard “creates the risk that officials will be
able to adopt policies that are the products of discriminatory intent so long as
they sufficiently mask their motives through the use of subtlety and illusion”).
104. THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE , supra note 6 (explaining Congress
overturned the Bolden ruling in 1982).
105. See On the Nomination of Judge John G. Roberts, Jr., to be Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Testimony of Wade
Henderson, Executive Director Leadership Conference on Civil Rights (Sept. 15,
2005), in THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE , www.civilrights.org/advocacy/
testimony/henderson-roberts.html?print=t (last visited Apr. 20, 2016) (stating
“Roberts was an aggressive enemy of the ‘results’ standard”).
106. Memorandum from John Roberts, to U.S. Att’y Gen. William French
Smith (Nov. 6, 1981) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration).

764

The John Marshall Law Review

[49:751

based test would “provide a basis for the most intrusive
interference imaginable by federal courts into the state and local
processes.”107
Despite these arguments, Congress eliminated the intent
based Bolden standard and crafted legislation that returned
Section 2 to the effects based standard108 laid out by the Supreme
Court in White v. Regester.109 Roberts maintained that members of
Congress “did not know what they were doing” when they voted for
the effects test. 110 For the effects test to prevail, however, its
congressional proponents had to embrace an updated bailout
provision—an idea that intent proponents like Roberts and the
Reagan administration supported.111
Originally, any city, county, or local municipality could not
seek a bailout independently, if it was located within a state that
qualified under the coverage formula. 112 Congress wanted to
“provide incentives to jurisdictions to attain compliance with the
law and increas[e] participation by minority citizens in the
political process of their community.” 113 The revised bailout
provisions allowed jurisdictions located within a covered state to
opt out of preclearance independently. The updated provision
required jurisdictions seeking to opt out to show it had a ten-year

107. Memorandum from John Roberts, to U.S. Att’y Gen. William French
Smith (Dec. 22, 1981) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration).
108. S. REP. No. 97-417, at 2 (1982) reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 177,
179 [hereinafter 1982 Senate Report] (clarifying that Congress amended
Section 2 “to make clear that proof of discriminatory intent is not required to
establish a violation under Section 2”). The House also wanted to make it clear
discriminatory intent was not required: “[t]he amendment clarifies the
ambiguities which have arisen in the wake of the Bolden decision. It is
intended by this clarification that proof of intent is not a prerequisite to
establish voting discrimination violations in Section 2 cases.” H.R. REP. No.
97-227, at 2 (1981).
109. White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755 (1973) (holding Section 2 requires
plaintiffs to show discriminatory results, but not intent or purpose).
110. Memorandum from John Roberts, to U.S. Att’y Gen. William French
Smith (Jan 26, 1982) (on file with the U.S. National Archives and Records
Administration) [hereinafter Jan. 1982 Memorandum]. Roberts also urged the
attorney general to use his memos, which he argued would help Senators
become more educated on the dangers of the effects tests. Id.
111. See Adam Serwer, Chief Justice Roberts’ Long War Against the Voting
Rights Act, MOTHER JONES , Feb. 27, 2013, 7:01 AM, www.motherjones.com/
politics/2013/02/john-roberts-long-war-against-voting-rights-act (explaining that
Roberts and the Reagan administration supported the intent standard and the
updated bailout provision).
112. J. Gerald Hebert, An Assessment of the Bailout Provisions of The
Voting Rights Act, in VOTING RIGHTS ACT REAUTHORIZATION OF 2006 262
(2007).
113. 1982 Senate Report, supra note 108, at 44.
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record of nondiscriminatory voting practices and engaged in efforts
to expand minority voter participation. 114
The effects versus intent fight of 1982 would not be the only
time Roberts took a strong stance on a racially charged issue as a
Reagan administration adviser. Roberts also favored the
administration’s “anti-busing and anti-quotas” campaigns. 115 Even
in the 1980s, Roberts was quick to claim victory in the battle for
all to bask in the light of equality. 116 For Roberts, there was no
need for the administration to continue the fight for civil rights;
rather, doing so would be discriminatory in and of itself. He
argued that the effects of school busing, racially based hiring
quotas, and other race conscious remedies would constitute
“reverse discrimination.”117 He advised that it made “eminent
sense” to seek legislation that permanently barred the use of
employment quotas. 118 Roberts also took umbrage with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission, which he thought was
taking positions that solicited discrimination claims that were
“totally inconsistent” with the administration’s policies. 119 Roberts
even “regarded civil rights enforcement by prior administrations
as wrong-minded and viewed with suspicion the career lawyers in
the Civil Rights Division of the Reagan Justice Department.”120
During his 2005 confirmation hearings, Roberts and his
supporters argued these beliefs were not as tightly held as others
suggested, but were simply declarations of the Reagan
administration’s stance at the time. 121 Once he took his lifetime

114. Hebert, supra note 112, at 262. Absent these changes, nearly all the
covered jurisdictions would have been eligible for a bailout. Id. at 261. The
then current bailout required jurisdictions to show that they had not enacted a
discriminatory voting practice since 1965. Id. Because the VRA prohibited
them from passing such practices, nearly all covered jurisdictions would have
been eligible for a bailout—a happenstance Congress thought to be “wholly unwarranted” especially when “problems of discrimination and widespread
failure to comply with the Voting Rights Act in the covered jurisdictions” still
persisted. 1982 Senate Report, supra note 108, at 44.
115. Linda Greenhouse, A Tale of Two Justices, G REEN BAG 11, 44 (2007).
(explaining that Roberts wrote a series of memoranda urging policy positions
to advance the administration’s anti-busing and anti-quota principles).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. R. Jeffery Smith & Charles Babington, Roberts Memo Urged Laws
Prohibiting Busing, Quotas, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 30, 2005, at A2.
119. Id.
120. Greenhouse, supra note 115, at 44.
121. Roberts and others defended these statements by arguing they
“merely show[ed] that he was [just] being a good solider when he was in the
Reagan Administration.” Serwer, supra note 111. See also Confirmation
Hearing, supra note 2, at 173 (Roberts stating “the articulation of [these]
views . . . represented my effort to articulate the views of the administration
and the position of the administration for whom I worked, for which I worked,
23 years ago”).
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seat on the bench as the chief justice of the United States Supreme
Court, however, Roberts had no problem repeating his 1980s
attitudes. Specifically, the revised bailout provisions would soon
become irrelevant and seemingly forgotten when Roberts attained
two additional chances to put his mark on the VRA. 122
4.

John Roberts Gets a New Title, but Sings the Same Song

In 2009, as chief justice of the United States Supreme Court,
John Roberts, found himself in an improved position to attack the
VRA, albeit from a different angle. 123 He got his first chance in
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder
(Northwest Austin).124 There a municipal district in Texas sought a
bailout exemption from federal preclearance. 125 The district met
the provision’s requirements and was thus eligible for a bailout. 126
However, in the process of seeking their bailout, the district also
challenged
the
overall
constitutionality
of
preclearance
requirements. 127
In granting the bailout, the Court declined to address the
constitutional challenge. 128 Nonetheless, writing for the majority,
Roberts sharply criticized the coverage formula for being “based on
data that is now more than [thirty-five] years old.”129 He added
that the coverage formula “fails to account for current political
conditions.”130 Roberts’s opinion of the formula remained
unchanged four years later.
In 2013, Roberts wrote the majority opinion in Shelby County
v. Holder. 131 In holding Section 4(b)’s coverage formula
unconstitutional, Roberts repeated his Northwest Austin
critiques. 132 He again chastised the formula for being “based on

122. The chief justice would later write the majority opinions in Northwest
Austin, 557 U.S. 193 and Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. 2612.
123. Roberts drafted previous attacks on the Section 2 of the VRA as an
advisor to the Reagan administration; but as chief justice, Roberts challenged
the Act’s coverage formula and preclearance provisions. Serwer, supra note
111. See also Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 193; Shelby County, 133 U.S. at
2612.
124. 557 U.S. 193.
125. Id. at 196-97 (explaining jurisdictions are eligible to bail-out of
Section 5 preclearance requirements “if certain rigorous conditions are met.”).
126. Id. at 197 (the district did not have a history of discrimination in its
elections and it engaged in efforts to expand minority voter participation).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 211.
129. Id. at 203.
130. Id.
131. 133 S. Ct. 2612.
132. Compare Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 203 (stating “[t]he [VRA’s]
coverage formula is based on data that is now more than [thirty-five] years
old, and there is considerable evidence that it fails to account for current
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decades-old data and eradicated practices”133 and added that it
was “irrational for Congress to distinguish between States in such
a fundamental way.”134 Often citing his own Northwest Austin
dicta, 135 Roberts asserted the coverage formula violated the
fundamental principle of equal state sovereignty. 136 The chief
justice did recognize that the VRA was originally upheld in 1966
despite being “an uncommon exercise of congressional power.” 137
Roberts, however, reasoned that the Court only reached that
conclusion because of the “exceptional conditions” during that
time. 138 To Roberts, “nearly 50 years later, things have changed
dramatically” and the conditions in covered jurisdictions were no
longer exceptional. 139 Thirty years removed from his advising
days, Roberts still believed that Congress did not know what it
was doing when it came to the VRA. 140

III. WHAT I S AND WHAT SHOULD NEVER BE141
Chief Justice Roberts’s views on race in the United States do
not vary whether they are articulated in the context of education
as a chief justice of the Supreme Court, hiring practices as an
Advisor to the Reagan administration, or voting rights as both.
This section first details Roberts’s stances on race preceding
Shelby County. Next, it identifies conjectures Roberts expounds in
Shelby County about racism’s contemporary impotence and the
lawful scope of the federal government’s relationship with the
states in the context of voting legislation. Finally, this section puts
Roberts’s conclusions under a microscope, revealing their flaws.
political conditions”), with Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2627 (stating “[n]early
[fifty] years later, things have changed dramatically”).
133. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2627. Roberts also argued that literacy
tests and other discriminatory schemes “have been banned for over [forty]
years” and “voter registration and turnout numbers in covered States have
risen dramatically.” Id.
134. Id. at 2630-31.
135. Northwest Austin could have demonstrated the VRA was capable of
protecting reformed jurisdictions from unwarranted federal oversight;
however in Shelby County, Roberts chose to cite Northwest Austin’s emphasis
on the VRA’s pernicious violation of equal state sovereignty. See id. at 2624
(stating “as we made clear in Northwest Austin, the fundamental principle of
equal sovereignty remains highly pertinent in assessing subsequent disparate
treatment of States.”).
136. Id. at 2623. Roberts criticized the dissent for refusing “to consider the
principle of equal sovereignty, despite Northwest Austin’s emphasis on its
significance.” Id. at 2630.
137. Id. at 2624 (citing Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 334).
138. Id.
139. Id. at 2625.
140. Jan. 1982 Memorandum, supra note 110.
141. LED ZEPPELIN, What is and What Should Never Be, on LED ZEPPELIN
II (Atlantic Records 1969).
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A. When Roberts Is in the Driver’s Seat, Racism Is
Always in the Rear View Mirror, or Maybe It Is Just
in His Blind Spot
As chief justice, Roberts’s judicial opinions on race seem to
gloss over, and perhaps rewrite history. Specifically, in his
majority opinion of Parents Involved in Community Schools v.
Seattle School District,142 Roberts attempted to rewrite the context
of Brown v. Board of Education.143 In Parents Involved, the Court
addressed two Washington state school districts’ adoption of a
race-based integration program. 144 Roberts’s opinion vilipended
the nation’s history of racial discrimination and the residual
effects it continues to have on today’s society. 145
In striking down the policies, the chief justice claimed Brown
as his precedent and declared that the hallmark case had nothing
to do with “the inequality of facilities.”146 To Roberts, because the
current policies allowed race to play a role in determining to which
schools children went to, the policies were just as evil as
Brown’s.147 Both the Parents Involved’s and Brown’s policies,
Roberts wrote, told children “where they could and could not go to
school based on of the color of their skin.”148 Yet, only by removing
the context behind the differing districts’ policies could Roberts
claim that Parents Involved was just like Brown.149 There were
profound differences; Brown’s policies were enacted to keep black
kids out of white schools while the contemporary policies were
enacted to create opportunity. 150
Previously, the Court held that the Constitution does not
require school districts to set up racial balancing quotas, yet
“school authorities may well conclude that some kind of racial
142. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1 (Parents
Involved), 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
143. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
144. The Seattle districts allowed students to rank which schools they
wanted to attend. Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 711. If a school reached its
capacity, the tiebreaker used was based on race. Id. The other district
involved, Jefferson County, allowed students to rank their preferred schools,
and these preferences were subjected to a rule that each school must maintain
an African American enrollment rate of 15 to 50 percent. Id. at 716.
145. Id. at 705.
146. Id.
147. Id. at 747.
148. Id.
149. Id.
150. Stevens put the differences between the cases perfectly in his dissent:
“[t]he Chief Justice fails to note that it was only black schoolchildren who were
so ordered [that they could not go to school based on their skin color]; indeed,
the history books do not tell stories of white children struggling to attend
black schools.” Id. at 799 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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balance in schools is desirable.”151 The Court was not the only
branch of government that accepted this constitutional principal.
Congress has enacted numerous race-conscious statutes that seek
to improve race conditions. 152 Presidents have also used their
executive authority to support race-conscious efforts. 153 These
views exemplify the objectives of the Civil War Amendments;
devices that brought those out of a darkness defined by chains and
whips and into the light of American society defined by life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. 154
Though the chief justice believes in a colorblind Constitution,
the only way to achieve such a reality would be to strip the
document of its history. From their drafting, the Civil War
Amendments etched out an undeniable distinction between raceconscious policies that were perniciously designed to keep races
apart, and those that painstakingly worked to bring races
together.155 As Justice Stephen Breyer contended, the Equal
Protection Clause “sought to bring into American society as full
members those whom the nation had previously held in
slavery.”156 Breyer also reminded the Court that those who drafted
the Constitution outlined a “practical difference between the use of
race conscious criteria in defiance of [keeping races apart] and the
use of race conscious criteria to [bring races together].” 157
151. North Carolina Bd. of Ed. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45 (1971). See also
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Ed., 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (stating
“[s]chool authorities are traditionally charged with broad power to formulate
and implement educational policy and might well conclude, for example, that
in order to prepare students to live in a pluralistic society each school should
have a prescribed ratio of Negro to white students reflecting the proportion for
the district as a whole”).
152. See e.g., Title II of the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(a)
(outlawing discrimination based on race, color, religion, or national origin in
any place of public accommodation); 20 U.S.C. § 6311 (requiring state
educational agencies to file education plans that focus on improving academic
achievement of “major racial and ethnic subgroups” in order to receive grant
money under The No Child Left Behind Act).
153. See Exec. Order No. 10925, 26 C.F.R. § 1977-79 (1961) (expressing
President John F. Kennedy’s commitment to equal employment).
154. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 71 (stating “[N]o one can fail to
be impressed with the one pervading purpose found in [all the Reconstruction
amendments] . . . the freedom of the slave race”); Strauder v. West Virginia,
100 U.S. 303, 306 (1880) (stating that the Fourteenth Amendment “is one of a
serious of constitutional provisions having a common purpose; namely,
securing to a race recently emancipated . . . all the civil rights that the
superior race enjoy”).
155. TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 62, at 22-23.
156. Id.
157. Id. (stating “Breyer reasoned that the Constitution protects against
the subordination of minorities but permits government to invoke race when it
has solid justifications and beneficial purposes”). See also Grutter v. Bollinger,
539 U.S. 306, 327 (2003) (stating “[c]ontext matters when reviewing racebased governmental action under the Equal Protection Clause”).
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The chief justice, however, sees no difference between policies
of inclusion and exclusion based on race. Rather, Roberts argued
any integration policy that features race exposes the evils of
segregation and discrimination. 158 To Roberts, the United States’
infamous epidemic of racism has long since ceased to have any
effect on today’s society. 159 Roberts’s indifference towards racial
issues in the context of education mirrors his attitudes when he
weighs voting issues.
1.

Roberts: The South Has Changed, but Only with a Little
Help from Its Friends

In 2009, the chief justice laid Shelby County’s ground work in
Northwest Austin. Though he was forced to forgo voiding the
VRA’s coverage formula completely because Northwest Austin was
eligible for a bailout, Roberts did not refrain from expressing his
disdain for the formula. 160 Shelby County, in contrast, was
ineligible for a bailout because the attorney general “recently
objected to voting changes proposed from within the county.” 161
Instead of reminding Roberts why the coverage formula was still
appropriate, this distinction only paved the way for the chief
justice to strike down the formula. 162
Just as he did in Northwest Austin, Roberts proclaimed that
while no one doubts that voting discrimination still exists, 163 “the
conditions that originally justified these measures no longer
characterize voting in the covered jurisdictions.” 164 The chief
justice declared that Congress could not “rely simply on the

158. See TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 62, at 25 (stating Justices “Roberts and
Thomas believe that state-sponsored integration is reminiscent of
segregation”). See also Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 747 (striking down the
integration policies because the districts did not carry “the heavy burden of
demonstrating that we should allow [race to determine where one goes to
school] even for very different reasons.”); League of United Latin A. Citizens v.
Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 449 (2006) (Roberts C.J., concurring in part, concurring in
the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (condemning “the sordid
business [of] divvying us up by race”).
159. See Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2625 (stating “[n]early 50 years later,
things have changed dramatically).
160. See generally Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 197 (denying to reach the
constitutional challenge because the “district is eligible under the Act to seek
bailout”).
161. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2621.
162. Shelby County strictly tailored its lawsuit and argued “sections 4(b)
and 5 [of the VRA] are facially unconstitutional.” Id. at 2615.
163. Compare Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 203 (stating “[i]t may be . . .
that conditions continue to warrant preclearance”), with Shelby County, 133 S.
Ct. at 2619 (conceding that “voting discrimination still exists; no one doubts
that”).
164. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2618.
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past”165 when it reauthorized the VRA. 166 Roberts lambasted
Congress for reauthorizing the Act without considering the strides
that the nation made. 167 This is not the first time that Roberts
argued that Congress did not know what it was doing, 168 and
thirty years of successful operation of the VRA did not make an
impression on Roberts. 169
Congress, however, did not take this task of reauthorizing the
VRA lightly; a fact Roberts’s opinion generally ignores. 170 In
something we rarely see today, 171 Congress vigorously went to
work to determine whether the 1965 coverage formula was still
appropriate in 2006.172 The legislative process included extensive

165. Id. at 2629.
166. When looking at this argument on its face, it is fairly agreeable. Yet,
the best way of looking at today’s conditions is by recognizing the VRA’s role in
this progress. As this section explains, today’s equality would not be realized
without the VRA’s coverage formula and preclearance. Justice Ginsburg put it
perfectly in her dissent when she explained “[t]hrowing out preclearance when
it has worked and is continuing to work to stop discriminatory changes is like
throwing away your umbrella in a rainstorm because you are not getting wet.”
Id. at 2650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
167. See id. at 2626 (majority opinion) (scoffing at the lack of any easing of
the VRA’s restrictions and arguing that instead “the Act’s unusual remedies
have grown even stronger”).
168. Jan. 1982 Memorandum, supra note 110.
169. See Wade Henderson, The Voting Rights Act of 1965: 40 Years After
‘Bloody Sunday,’ A Promise Still Unfulfilled, THE LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE
(Mar. 2, 2005), www.civilrights.org/voting-rights/vra/2006/the-voting-rights-actof-1965-40-years-after-bloody-sunday-a-promise-still-unfulfilled.html
(stating
the “VRA has become one of the most successful civil rights laws in American
history.” “it has guaranteed millions of minority voters the equal
opportunity[,] . . . ended literacy tests, poll taxes and other purposefully
prejudiced mechanisms”).
170. Throughout his opinion, Roberts cherry-picks from Congress’s
findings; often citing the portions of the congressional reports that fit his
narrative, while downplaying any findings of racial discrimination. See Shelby
County, 133 S. Ct. at 2625 (stating “there has been approximately a 1,000
percent increase since 1965 in the number of African -American elected
officials in the six States originally covered by the [VRA]”) (citing H.R. REP.
No. 109-478, at 12 (2006), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 618, 628
[hereinafter 2006 House Report]); Id. at 2629 (stating the 2006
reauthorization “ignores these developments” and that “no one can fairly say
that [Congress’s finding] shows anything approaching the ‘pervasive,’
‘flagrant,’ ‘widespread,’ and ‘rampant’ discrimination that faced Congress in
1965”).
171. The 113th Congress was the least productive in history. Chris
Cillizza, Yes, President Obama Is Right. The 113th Congress Will Be the Least
Productive in History, WASH. POST, Apr. 10, 2014, www.washingtonpost.com
/blogs/the-fix/wp/2014/04/10/president-obama-said-the-113th-congress-is-theleast-productive-ever-is-he-right/ (explaining that “according to the Federal
Register, there have only been 23 public laws enacted in the second session of
the 113th Congress—a number that virtually ensures that this Congress will
pass the fewest number of laws of any in history”).
172. See generally 2006 House Report, supra note 170; S. REP. No. 109-295
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hearings in both chambers, 173 amassing a 15,000-page record. 174 In
addition to oral testimony given at the hearings, Congress received
scores
of
investigative
reports
and
other
statistical
documentation. 175 Through these hearings, Congress learned the
classic forms of racial discrimination were still occurring in
jurisdictions covered by the decades old coverage formula. 176
Notably, this congressional enquiry revealed that state legislators
in Mississippi referred to an early 1990s redistricting plan that
would have increased the number of black majority districts as the
“black plan” publically and “the nigger plan” in private. 177
Congress also found similar abhorrent racism in Georgia where
the state’s House Reapportionment Committee chairman had on
numerous occasions told his colleagues that he did not “want to
draw nigger districts.”178 The fact that these and hundreds of other
instances of discrimination occurred at all only underscored the
VRA’s vital role in inhibiting such prejudice.
The chief justice, however, was ultimately unconvinced. 179
Congress’s 15,000 pages were not enough, nor were its discovered
examples of state congressional leaders using the “n” word. 180 It is

(2006) [hereinafter 2006 Senate Report] (detailing Congress’s extensive
findings).
173. The Senate Judiciary Committee held nine hearings and received
testimony from forty-six witnesses, while the House Judiciary Committee held
twelve hearings where forty-six witnesses also testified. 2006 Senate Report,
supra note 172, at 10.
174. Id.; 2006 House Report, supra note 170, at 5 (stating the House
Committee’s report “results from the development of one of the most extensive
legislative records in the Committee on the Judiciary’s history.”). Even
Roberts’s majority opinion in Northwest Austin conceded, “Congress amassed a
sizeable record in support of its decision to extend the preclearance
requirements.” Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 205.
175. Specifically, during its hearings in front of the Subcommittee on the
Constitution, the House Judiciary Committee received and incorporated into
the legislative record a report from the ACLU’s Voting Rights Project that
cited and assessed 293 cases involving allegations of voting discrimination
since 1982. Shelby Cnty., Ala. v. Holder, 811 F. Supp. 2d 424, 435 (D.D.C.
2011) aff’d, 679 F.3d 848 (D.C. Cir. 2012) rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) and
vacated and remanded, 541 F. App’x 1 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
176. 2006 Senate Report, supra note 172, at 14; 2006 House Report, supra
note 170, at 67.
177. 2006 Senate Report, supra note 172, at 14.
178. 2006 House Report, supra note 170, at 67.
179. As a Reagan advisor Roberts also disagreed that Congress had enough
evidence to reauthorize the VRA in 1982. See Confirmation Hearing, supra
note 2, at 171 (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (confronting Roberts with his past
claims that “there [was] no evidence of voting abuses nationwide supporting
the need for such a change for a change” and adding that he [Kennedy] “was
there . . . [at the] extensive hearings [where the House and Senate] considered
detail-specific testimony from affected voters throughout the country.”).
180. The congressional record surpassed 15,000 pages and included
multiple instances of state officials using the “n” word. Shelby County, 133 S.
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hard to imagine what it would have took for Roberts to agree that
these jurisdictions should remain covered. In one breath, Roberts
asserted the cited instances of racism did not reach “the
‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’ ‘widespread,’ and ‘rampant’ discrimination
that faced Congress in 1965,” but in the next proclaimed “any
racial discrimination in voting is too much.” 181 Though it seems
difficult to square these two assertions, what is clear is that recent
history was most important to Roberts.182
In his Shelby County majority opinion, the chief justice
proclaimed, “history did not end in 1965” 183 when the VRA was
enacted; however, “there had been 40 more years” 184 leading up to
Congress’s most recent reauthorization. 185 Roberts demanded that
it was this forty years of history that could not be ignored.186
Roberts stressed that enormous strides made in the South defined
this recent history. 187 Roberts did concede that the VRA was the
driving force behind this progress. 188 Yet in order to conclude the
way he did, Roberts inevitably downplayed the VRA’s role in
insuring these developments. 189 The holding showed that the chief
justice simply could not appreciate the level of resistance that still
exists in today’s voting atmosphere. 190 Roberts claimed the passing
of forty years led to a much more progressive and tolerant
South. 191 Yet, the congressional findings reveal that the South had
not independently come as far as the chief justice professed.
Ct. at 2636 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); 2006 Senate Report, supra note 172, at
14; 2006 House Report, supra note 170, at 67.
181. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2629, 2631 (internal citations omitted).
182. See id. at 2630-31 (explaining that it is “irrational for Congress to
distinguish between States in such a fundamental way based on forty-year-old
data when today’s statistics tell an entirely different story.”).
183. Id. at 2628.
184. Id.
185. Congress reauthorized the VRA’s coverage formula and preclearance
requirement in 2006. Gaughan, supra note 25, at 118.
186. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2628.
187. Id. (explaining between 1965 and 2006 “voting tests were abolished,
disparities in voter registration and turnout due to race were erased, and
African-Americans attained political office in record numbers”).
188. Id. (stating the past forty years of progress is “largely because of the
Voting Rights Act”).
189. Id. (asserting “largely because of the Voting Rights Act, voting tests
were abolished, disparities in voter registration and turnout due to race were
erased, and African-Americans attained political office in record numbers. And
yet the coverage formula . . . ignores these developments . . . .”).
190. Southern legislators using the “n” word and the amount of
objectionable laws that would have gone into effect if not for federal
preclearance demonstrates voting discrimination still occurs even in today’s
society. See 2006 Senate Report, supra note 172, at 14 (referencing Mississippi
legislators using the “n” word to describe a redistricting plan); 2006 House
Report, supra note 170, at 67 (citing a Georgia congressman’s use of the “n”
word).
191. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2625.
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Without the coverage formula and federal preclearance, even
covered jurisdictions’ recent history would be unrecognizable. The
Department of Justice (DOJ) objected to more voting laws between
1982 and 2004 than between 1965 and 1982. 192 The violations
were hardly innocuous. In 1995, a federal court struck down a
Mississippi registration system “which was initially enacted in
1892 to disenfranchise Black voters.”193 In 2001, the DOJ
intervened after the white mayor of Kilmichael, Mississippi, and
the city’s five aldermen, 194 suddenly canceled the town’s election
after “an unprecedented number” of black candidates attempted to
run for office. 195 Even as recently as 2006, the Supreme Court
prevented Texas’ attempt to redraw district lines that reduced the
voting power of Latino voters. 196 Without the coverage formula and
federal preclearance, southern legislatures would have been free to
enact these and countless other discriminatory voting laws. 197
Roberts’s conclusion that “things have changed dramatically”
is naïve. Though schools are desegregated and the South is no
longer riddled with “whites only” signs, 198 his assertion that the
coverage formula does not warrant current conditions is
misplaced. 199 If one just considers the past 20 years, it is clear that

192. Id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). There were 626 objections
between ’82 and ’04 and only 490 between ’65 and ’82. Id.
193. The coverage formula and preclearance facilitated the federal court’s
prevention of this Mississippi law from going into effect. 2006 House Report,
supra note 170, at 39 (emphasis added).
194. The five aldermen were also white. Id at 36.
195. After the DOJ required the election, the town elected its first black
Mayor and three black aldermen. Id. at 36-37.
196. Perry, 548 U.S. at 440. In response, Texas then attempted to curtail
early voting in the district, but this too was blocked by federal preclearance.
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Texas, No. 06-cv-1046 (W.D. Tex.),
Doc. 8.
197. See 2006 House Report, supra note 170, at 37 (stating following the
2000 census the DOJ found a redistricting plan adopted by Albany, Georgia
had the “purpose to limit and retrogress the increased black voting strength”).
See also Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2641 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(explaining the DOJ blocked a proposed two year election delay of a majority
black district in Millen, Georgia that would have left the district without
representation on the city council for two years while majority white districts
would be able to elect three representatives).
198. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2627 (majority opinion). See THE
LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE , School Desegregation and Equal Educational
Opportunity,
www.civilrights.org/resources/civilrights101/desegregation.html
(last visited May, 10, 2016) (discussing the desegregation of schools
throughout the mid-20th century); Bob Greene, Signs of America’s racial past,
CNN, Jan. 22, 2012, www.cnn.com/2012/01/22/opinion/greene-racial-signs/
index.html (detailing the prevalence of “white only” signs in the South as late
as the 1970s).
199. See Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2631 (holding “Congress must ensure
that the legislation it passes to remedy [racial discrimination in voting] speaks
to current conditions”).
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things simply would not have changed without the coverage
formula.200 Congress’s decision to reauthorize the VRA reflected
findings of persistent racial voting discrimination in covered
jurisdictions.201 What’s more, the Act also accommodated for
dramatic changes in covered jurisdictions. If covered jurisdictions
refrained from discriminating the Act’s bailout provision released
them from the coverage formula and preclearance. 202 Northwest
Austin proved the bailout provision was capable of jettisoning any
unjustified constraints. 203 In Shelby County, however, Roberts
ignored the bailout provision’s ability to absolve tolerant
jurisdictions.
2.

The Bailout Provision Will Set You Free

In Shelby County, Roberts asserted that “the [VRA] has not
eased the restrictions in § 5 or narrowed the scope of the coverage
formula in § 4(b)” as our nation became more progressive. 204 This
argument, though on its face is true, is only persuasive if one
ignores the 1982 changes to the VRA’s bailout provision. The
bailout provision terminates the preclearance requirement,
rendering Sections 4 and 5 moot, if a covered jurisdiction satisfies
certain conditions. 205 During the first fifteen years of the VRA, the
bailout provision was extremely difficult to satisfy. The pre-1982
bailout provision required covered jurisdictions to show that they
did not reinstate any discriminatory devices or schemes within the
past seventeen years. 206 Additionally, sub-jurisdictions located
within covered states were not allowed to bailout independently. 207
This changed in 1982. 208

200. Id. at 2639 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
201. 2006 Senate Report, supra note 172; 2006 House Report, supra note
170.
202. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (asserting
that the bailout provision enabled “the VRA to be a dynamic statute, capable
of adjusting to changing conditions.”).
203. Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 211 (finding Northwest Austin eligible
for a bailout without holding preclearance unconstitutional). See also Shelby
County, 133 S. Ct. at 2621 (stating “the Court’s construction of the bailout
provision [in Northwest Austin] left the constitutional issues for another
day.”).
204. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2626.
205. Serwer, supra note 111.
206. Hebert, supra note 112, at 260-62 (detailing the high hurdles
preclearance imposed on states from 1965 to 1982 that required covered
jurisdictions “to prove no test or device had been used for a racially
discriminatory purpose or effect within the past seventeen years”).
207. Id.
208. Serwer, supra note 111, (explaining Congress amended the VRA’s
bailout provision in 1982).
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The 1982 Amendment to the bailout provision not only
allowed
jurisdictions
within
covered
states
to
bailout
independently, it also provided a more honest opportunity for
eligible jurisdictions to bailout. 209 Under the amended provisions,
covered jurisdictions now only had to demonstrate that during the
ten years following the passage of the VRA, they did not propose a
law that was later thwarted by preclearance. 210 These jurisdictions
also had to show that they took additional steps to prevent future
discrimination. 211 The updated provisions allowed jurisdictions
that truly changed to rid themselves of their covered status and
preclearance. 212 This was not an impossible task for commendable
jurisdictions; since the current bailout procedures became effective
in 1984, nearly 200 jurisdictions have successfully escaped the
preclearance requirement. 213 Roberts’s assertion that Congress has
not eased the coverage formula or preclearance requirements is
just another example of the chief justice’s disingenuous
characterization of history. 214

209. The original bailout provision of the 1965 version of the VRA required
any covered jurisdiction to show that it had not used a discriminatory device
five years prior to the VRA’s enactment. Id. at 260. When Congress
reauthorized the VRA in 1970 and 1975, it abstained from adopting any
sincere reforms to the bailout standards. Id. These unreachable benchmarks
continued to preclude practically every covered jurisdiction from bailing out
until the 1982 amendments. Id.
210. Id. at 262-63 (stating the full requirements as followed: “(1) [n]o test
or device has been used to determine voter eligibility with the purpose or effect
of discrimination; (2) [n]o final judgments, consent decrees, or settlements
have been entered against the jurisdiction for racially discriminatory voting
practices; (3) [n]o federal examiners have been assigned to monitor elections;
(4) [t]here has been timely preclearance submission o f all voting changes and
full compliance with Section 5; and (5) [t]here have been no objections by the
Department of Justice or the District Court for the District of Columbia to any
submitted voting changes”).
211. Specifically, the covered jurisdictions had to show “(1) [a]ny dilutive
voting or election procedures have been eliminated; (2) [c]onstructive efforts
have been made to eliminate any known harassment or intimidation of voters;
[and] (3) [t]hey have engaged in other constructive efforts at increasing
minority voter participation such as expanding opportunities for convenient
registration and voting, and appointing minority election officials throughout
all stages of the registration/election process.” Id. at 263.
212. 2006 House Report, supra note 170, at 25 (explaining that the revised
bailout provision “illustrates that . . . covered status is neither permanent nor
over-broad” and that covered status is “within the control of the jurisdiction
such that those jurisdictions that have a genuinely clean record and want to
terminate coverage have the ability to do so”).
213. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
214. Id. at 2626 (majority opinion) (stating that Congress “has not eased
the restrictions [of federal preclearance] or narrowed the scope of the coverage
formula”).
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Under the VRA, covered jurisdictions were not permanently
subjected to federal preclearance. 215 Covered jurisdictions needed
only show that they refrained from attempting to employ racially
discriminatory voting laws. 216 The injustice Roberts sought to
address—states subjected to federal preclearance despite current
enlightened conditions217—was perfectly capable of righting itself.
If there remained jurisdictions that could not bailout, those
realities only reinforced the arguments supporting the
contemporary aptness of the coverage formula and preclearance. 218
A closer look reveals the chief justice’s disregarding of the Act’s
ability to accommodate for current conditions was perhaps
necessary to support his half hazard theme that carried the day;
the coverage formula perniciously violated equal state sovereignty
by singling out certain states, but not every state.
3.

Equal State Sovereignty: A Fundamental Voting Rights
Principle That Dates Back All the Way To 2004

In Shelby County’s figurative prologue, Northwest Austin, the
chief justice repeatedly referenced a “historic tradition” of all
states enjoying “equal sovereignty.”219 Though our federalist
system embodies a separation of powers that allows states to
retain pieces of sovereignty, 220 careful reading of the precedent
cited by Roberts in Northwest Austin shows the principle of equal
state sovereignty is not fundamental, let alone a historic
tradition. 221 More importantly, the cases cited are far removed
from the context of voting rights. 222

215. 2006 House Report, supra note 170, at 25.
216. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
217. Id. at 2629 (majority opinion) (contending that if Congress is to treat
States differently, it must single out states “on a basis that makes sense in
light of current conditions”).
218. See id. at 2644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating the fact that many
jurisdictions are unable to opt out “reinforces the congressional judgment that
these jurisdictions were rightfully subject to preclearance, and ought to
remain under that regime”).
219. Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 203 (stating the VRA “differentiates
between the States, despite our historic tradition that all the States enjoy
‘equal sovereignty’”).
220. U.S. CONST. amend. X (stating, “The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are
reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”).
221. TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 62, at 34 (explaining equal state
sovereignty was a “new doctrine”).
222. See United States v. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1 (1960) (dealing with water
rights); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. 700 (1868) (settling disputed sales of assets
upon readmission into the union).
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In the first case that Roberts cites, United States v.
Louisiana, the Court resolved a territorial dispute between the
United States and various states. 223 The Court there stated:
[t]his Court early held that the 13 original States, by virtue of the
sovereignty acquired through revolution against the Crown, owned
the lands beneath navigable inland waters within their territorial
boundaries, and that each subsequently admitted State acquired
similar rights as an inseparable attribute of the equal sovereignty
guaranteed to it upon admission.224

Neither the Court’s words nor the context of this case
suggests that the principle of equal sovereignty extends to further
circumstances other than admission into the United States. The
Louisiana Court pulled from Pollard v. Hagan,225 an 1845 case
which held that states’ navigable waters, and the soils under
them, were not granted to the states by the Constitution. 226
Rather, these rights were reserved to the states respectively.227
Put simply, the states had these rights before the federal
government was created and kept them after the framing of the
Constitution. 228 Moreover, states that came into the union after
the revolution had the same territorial rights and sovereignty as
the original colonies. 229 The Louisiana decision merely references
Pollard’s principle that every state has an equivalent interest to
the land and water rights located within their territorial borders
and they hold those specific interests against other states and the
federal government.
Roberts’s citation to the second case, Texas v. White, also fails
to support a historic tradition of equal state sovereignty.230 In
White, the Court held sales of state assets made by Texas’
provisional Confederate government were void upon Texas’
readmission into the Union. 231 Before analyzing the matters facing
the Court, White begins with a lofty civics lesson: “[u]nder the
Constitution, . . . the powers of the States were much restricted,
still, all powers not delegated to the United States, nor prohibited
to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.”232 The broad language continues: “there [can] be no loss of
separate and independent autonomy to the States, through their
223. Louisiana, 363 U.S. 1.
224. Id. at 16 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
225. Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. 212 (1845).
226. See id. at 212 (stating that “[u]pon the admission of Alabama into the
union, the right of eminent domain, which had been temporarily held by the
United States, passed to the state”).
227. Id.
228. Louisiana, 363 U.S. at 16.
229. Pollard, 44 U.S. at 212.
230. White, 74 U.S. 700.
231. Id. at 733-34.
232. Id. at 725.
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union under the Constitution[.]”233 The latter is seemingly the
language Roberts cited to support his Northwest Austin claim that
the nation holds a “historic tradition that all the States enjoy
‘equal sovereignty.’”234 Standing alone, White’s assertion appears
seminal; however, the Court’s subsequent analysis and holding
undercuts any significance.
Though White briefly talks about states retaining elements of
sovereignty, the Court makes clear that states do not maintain
unfettered “separate and independent autonomy[.]”235 Specifically,
the Court held that “acts in furtherance or support of rebellion
against the United States, or intended to defeat the just rights of
citizens . . . must, in general, be regarded as invalid and void.”236
The White Court, however, did not hold that all the Texas’
Confederate legislature’s acts were void simply because they were
the products of a treasonous government. 237 The Court explained
“acts necessary to [the] peace and good order among citizens . . .
must be regarded . . . as valid” even though they emanated from
an unlawful government. 238 The Court only voided the specific
transactions at issue because their purpose defied the
Constitution. 239
White’s holding does not support Roberts’s Shelby County
assertion that “the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty
remains highly pertinent in assessing [the VRA’s] subsequent
disparate treatment of States.”240 On the contrary, White’s holding
supports a finding that the coverage formula’s operative effect
outweighs the principles of equal state sovereignty. 241 Specifically,
jurisdictions falling within the VRA’s coverage formula “intend[ed]
to defeat the just rights of citizens,” specifically their Fifteenth
Amendment rights. 242 White upheld federal voiding of state acts
that violated the constitution even though such federal
intervention infringed upon Texas’ equal sovereignty.243 In Shelby

233. Id. at 726.
234. Northwest Austin, 557 U.S. at 203 (citing Louisiana, 363 U.S. at 15;
White, 74 U.S. at 725-26. Roberts does not cite any specific White language in
Northwest Austin. Id.
235. White, 74 U.S. at 726.
236. Id. at 733.
237. Id.
238. Id. For example the Court asserted the legislature’s “acts sanctioning
and protecting marriage and domestic relations, governing the course of
descents, regulating the conveyance and transfer of property, real and
personal, and providing remedies for injuries to person and estate, and other
similar acts” were valid. Id.
239. Id.
240. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2624.
241. See White, 74 U.S. at 733 (holding the Confederate legislature’s acts
were invalid and voidable because they violated the Constitution).
242. Id.
243. Id. White upheld Texas’s post–Civil War provisional government’s
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County, the coverage formula is a federal response to
unconstitutional acts by certain states and should too have been
upheld.
After reviewing Roberts’s citations, the chief justice’s
Northwest Austin claim that equal state sovereignty is a
fundamental principle appears shaky at best. To his credit,
Roberts did recognize the principle’s narrow foundation; conceding
that the previous cases that referenced equal state sovereignty
“concerned the admission of new states.” 244 Roberts further
accepted that “Katzenbach rejected the notion that the principle
operated as a bar on differential treatment outside [the admission
of new states].”245 The doctrine’s lack of effective precedential
support, 246 did not stop Roberts from relying on Northwest Austin’s
words throughout Shelby County.247 Doubling down, Roberts
ignored forty plus years of precedent and claimed that Northwest
Austin now trumped all. 248 Roberts even chastised the dissent for
“refus[ing] to consider the principle of equal [state] sovereignty,
despite Northwest Austin’s emphasis on its significance.”249
Roberts clung to his own Northwest Austin words in Shelby County
like a hanging chad to a ballot. 250 And understandably so;
Northwest Austin is the only case adjudicated after the year 1911,
let alone a case involving voting rights, that the chief justice could
cite to that refers to the “fundamental principle of equal
sovereignty.”251 Lack of precedential support aside, Roberts’s equal
state sovereignty simply ignores federalism’s flexibility when
states act unequally.

voiding of the transactions. Id. at 734. The provisional government was
created via federal intervention. Id. at 729. Admittedly, acting in furtherance
of a rebellion against the federal government is more egregious than passing
voting laws that violate the Fifteenth Amendment; however, each undertaking
violates the Constitution.
244. In Shelby County, Roberts cites another case, Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S.
559, 567 (1911), which similarly referenced equal state sovereignty in the
context of States admission into the Union. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2623-24.
245. Id. (emphasis in original).
246. TRIBE & MATZ, supra note 62, at 34 (describing equal state
sovereignty as a “new doctrine”).
247. See Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2623 (stating “as we made clear in
Northwest Austin, the fundamental principle of equal sovereignty remains
highly pertinent in assessing subsequent disparate treatment of States”).
248. Id. at 2630.
249. Id.
250. A “chad” is the portion of a paper ballot that voters punch out to
indicate which candidate they prefer. Carter M. Yang, Presidency Hinges on
Tiny Bits of Paper, ABC NEWS , Nov. 12, 2000, https://cseweb.ucsd.edu/~goguen
/courses/275f00/abc-chads.html. A “hanging chad” is any piece of paper that
remains stuck to the ballot. Id. Florida hanging chads caused great
controversy during the 2000 presidential election. Id.
251. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2630.
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When States Do Not Act Equally, Equal State
Sovereignty Is Inapplicable

Contrary to what Roberts contends, not every state is entitled
to equal treatment in the context of voting rights because not
every state equally attempts to enact discriminatory voting
laws. 252 Relying on the chief justice’s stance, one would expect the
number of Section 2 suits coming out of non-covered jurisdictions
to mirror the amount coming out of covered jurisdictions. 253
Surprisingly though, dissimilarities persist. 254 The rate of
successful Section 2 suits coming out of covered jurisdictions
consistently outnumbers the amount of successful suits arising out
of non-covered jurisdictions. 255 When adjusted for the population
differences, there has been nearly four times the amount of
successful Section 2 suits coming out covered jurisdictions than
non-covered. 256

IV. WHAT SHOULD HAVE B EEN AND WHAT NEEDS TO BE
By expanding equal state sovereignty’s application to voting
rights cases, the chief justice advanced the equality of the states
over the equality of the people. However, equal state sovereignty
contradicts the very nature of our country’s history, particularly
our history of race relations. Protecting the equal sovereignty of
the states from hypothetical federal government overreach seems
more important to Roberts than defending the people from the
actual unacceptable deprivation of the fundamental constitutional
right to vote. This section asserts how the chief justice should have

252. Supra part III. b.
253. Section 2 of the VRA applies nationwide and allows every citizen
regardless of geographic location to file claims alleging that their state’s voting
laws violate the VRA. 52 U.S.C. § 10301(b). With the coverage formula and
preclearance preventing the most egregiously discriminatory laws from
coming into place, it is logical for one to predict non -covered jurisdictions
would have exponentially more Section 2 suits than covered jurisdictions. See
Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2642 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing the
same).
254. Because preclearance would prevent covered jurisdictions’ most sordid
voting laws, one could expect more borderline Section 2 cases arising out of
covered jurisdictions. With less open and shut cases in the pool, there would
assumedly be a lower rate of successful Section 2 plaintiffs in covered
jurisdictions. Yet, we all know what happens when one assumes. See The Odd
Couple: My Strife in Court (ABC television broadcast Feb. 16, 1973) (stating
“[n]ever assume, because when you assume you make an ass of u and me”).
255. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2643 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(explaining “covered jurisdictions account for less than twenty-five percent of
the country’s population . . . . [but] accounted for fifty-six percent of the
successful § 2 litigation since 1982”).
256. Id.
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analyzed and held in Shelby County. It then proposes how
Congress should fix the now gutted VRA by looking at previous
congressional response to a Supreme Court opinion misapplying a
section of the VRA.

A. The Constitutional Centrality of Popular
Sovereignty, Not State Sovereignty
In Shelby County, Roberts derided the coverage formula for
representing an extraordinary departure from the nation’s
tradition of equal state sovereignty. 257 According to the chief
justice,
its
imposition
of
substantial
federalism
costs
inappropriately
encroached
on
covered
jurisdictions’
sovereignty. 258 That contention was the heart of Roberts’s
opinion. 259 Shelby County’s key issue should have, however, hinged
on protecting groups of people from discrimination at the hands of
state governments.
Deciding whether any government, federal or state, should be
allowed to deny the right to vote based on race is an easy task. The
answer is barely debatable: the government cannot do it. 260 Shelby
County’s question should have been tailored to whether racism
still existed in covered states warranting the VRA’s protections.
However, the chief justice instead framed Shelby County as a
question of whether the federal government could constitutionally
place restrictions on certain states and not others. In essence,
Shelby County boiled down to where sovereignty truly lies.261
Where sovereignty lies is not an open and shut issue; it is “our
oldest question of constitutional law.” 262 The debate continues
today because the structure of the Constitution accomplished the
unimaginable: it divided and limited sovereignty. 263

257. Id. at 2618 (majority opinion).
258. Id. at 2621, 2631.
259. Id. at 2631.
260. See U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
261. Sovereignty derives its origin from the French souverian, which
means “a supreme ruler not accountable to anyone, except perhaps to God.”
MICHAEL R. FOWLER & JULIE M. BUNCK, LAW POWER AND THE SOVEREIGN
STATE : THE EVOLUTION AND APPLICATION OF THE CONCEPT OF SOVEREIGNTY 4
(1995). The traditional concept of sovereignty reinforced the power of the king;
“a unitary central authority should wiled unlimited power over citizens and
subjects[.]” Timothy Zick, Are the States Sovereign?, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 229, 239
(2005) (describing Bodin’s, “who advanced the first comprehe nsive concept of
‘sovereignty’,” theory of sovereignty).
262. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 149 (1992).
263. See PETER S. O NUF, STATE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE MAKING OF THE
CONSTITUTION, IN CONCEPTUAL CHANGE AND THE CONSTITUTION 78-98 (1988)
(discussing the departure from the traditional concept of sovereignty that
occurred during the development of the Constitution).
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The Framers fiercely debated where sovereignty should rest
between the federal and state governments; 264 however, the
Constitution’s final draft avoided the term “sovereignty”
altogether. 265 This perhaps reflected the lessons learned through
the failures of the Articles of Confederation, which specifically
expressed that each state “retains its sovereignty, freedom and
independence.”266 Thus, the Constitution demonstrated a shift in
American governance; an unworkable agreement between
independent states transformed into a more nation-centered
country. While the Constitution’s ambiguity often defines the
genius of the document, 267 the sovereignty of the American people
was hardly disputed then and should not have been discounted by
Roberts in Shelby County.
When the battle over sovereignty pits the state’s right to
enact discriminatory voting laws against the federal government’s
authority to protect the rights of the people, the spirt of the
Fifteenth Amendment shows that ultimate sovereignty lies in the
hands of the citizens of the United States as a whole, rather than
the state. 268 Thomas Jefferson’s Declaration of Independence
characterized the sovereignty of the people as a self-evident
truth. 269 This principle was not lost after the Colonies won
independence over a tyrannical monarchy. James Madison
proclaimed that “[t]he ultimate authority, wherever the derivative

264. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 32 (Alexander Hamilton) (stating “the State
governments would clearly retain all the rights of sovereignty which they
before had and which were not . . . exclusively delegated to the United
States”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison) (explaining the
federal government’s “jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated objects only”
while the States retain “a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other
objects”).
265. U.S. CONST. See also Zick, supra note 261, at 242 (explaining the
Constitution does not specifically mention state sovereignty).
266. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. II.
267. See Justice William J. Brennan Jr., Address at Georgetown
University Teaching Symposium: Constitutional Interpretation (Oct. 12, 1985)
http://teachingamericanhistory.org/library/document/constitutionalinterpretation/) (stating “[f]or the genius of the Constitution rests not in any
static meaning it might have had in a world that is dead and gone, but in the
adaptability of its great principles to cope with current problems and current
needs”).
268. See AKHIL AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 361, 363,
399 (2005) (asserting that the Civil War Amendments “authorized
transformative new federal statutes to uproot all vestiges of unfreedom and
inequality” and provided “sweeping enforcement powers” “to enact
‘appropriate’ legislation targeting state abuses”).
269. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE , para. 2 (stating “We hold
these truths to be self-evident, that . . . it is the Right of the People to . . .
institute new Government, laying its foundation on such principles and
organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall seem most likely to effect
their Safety and Happiness.”).
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may be found, resides in the people alone[.]”270 The states and our
nation as a whole are made by the people and for the people. 271
When weighing the sovereignty of the state against the
sovereignty of the people, the scales tip in favor of the people. 272
This is especially true when states enact laws that violate the
fundamental constitutional right for the American people to
vote. 273
No matter how much sovereignty the states retain from the
federal government, Congress may still nonetheless engage in an
“uncommon exercise of power” when dealing with “exceptional
conditions.”274 Exceptional conditions were created by states hellbent on disenfranchising black voters. 275 To combat the states’
pernicious voting discrimination, Congress acted with an
uncommon exercise of power and passed the VRA in 1965. 276 It
later concluded covered jurisdictions’ voting conditions still
warranted this uncommon exercise of power by reauthorizing the
VRA in 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006. 277 In Shelby County, Roberts
270. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison); see also Chisolm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471 (1793) (stating that “[the people] are truly the
sovereigns of the country”).
271. See James Wilson, Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention (1787),
reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS ’ CONSTITUTION 62 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph
Lerner eds., 1987) (stating, “I view the States as made for the people as well as
by them, and not the people as made for the States”).
272. James Madison referred to the state and federal governments as mere
“agents and trustees of the people” and not ultimate sovereigns. THE
FEDERALIST NO. 46 (James Madison). Likewise, Thomas Jefferson repeatedly
emphasized the people were the only legitimate source of government. Thomas
Jefferson to Spencer Roane (1821), reprinted in 15 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 328 (Lipscomb and Bergh, eds., 1903-1904) (Jefferson stating “[it
is] the people, to whom all authority belongs.”). Moreover, Jefferson contended
that the “constitutions of most of our States assert that all power is inherent
in the people.” Thomas Jefferson to John Cartwright (1824), reprinted in 16
WRITINGS 45.
273. The right to vote has proved to be a tricky right for the Court to
classify. Compare Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992) (holding the
right to vote is a fundamental right) with Burdick v. Takushi, 504 U.S. 428,
433-34 (1992) (finding not all voting rights cases require strict scrutiny; i.e.,
that the right to vote is not always fundamental). Still, despite the
inconsistencies chief justice Roberts maintained the right to vote was an
essential right during his Senate Confirmation Hearing. See Confirmation
Hearing, supra note 2, at 171 (Roberts stating the right to vote is “one of . . .
the most precious rights we have as Americans.”).
274. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 334 (explaining “the Court has recognized
that exceptional conditions can justify legislative measures not otherwise
appropriate”).
275. See id. at 309 (stating Congress was confronted by racial
discrimination in voting; “an insidious and pervasive evil which had been
perpetuated in certain parts of our country through unremitting and ingenious
defiance of the Constitution”).
276. Id. at 308-09.
277. Hebert, supra note 112, at 258. The Civil-War Amendments were also
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faced Congress’s most recent comprehensive record.278 A record
containing scores of contemporary examples of states’ attempts at
enacting discriminatory voting laws. 279 Roberts’s holding
minimized and ignored these egregious intrusions on the Fifteenth
Amendment rights of these citizens. 280 Instead, Roberts chose to
emphasize the importance of preventing the federal government 281
from encroaching on the sovereignty of the states. 282 His reasoning
contradicts and disregards the aforementioned principles.
The rights and sovereignty of the people are not to be
outweighed by the right of governments to enact oppressive voting
laws that violate the Fifteenth Amendment. The concept of equal
state sovereignty is misguided because states are regularly
subordinated to the power of the federal government. For instance,
the EPA can regulate states that experience pollution problems, 283
federal immigration authorities can survey border states, 284 and
the Justice Department can watch over state governments that
suffer from internal corruption. 285 Even if Roberts’s equal state
a direct response to racial discrimination. Race and Voting in the Segregated
South, supra note 11.
278. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2629-30.
279. 2006 House Report, supra note 170; 2006 Senate Report, supra note
172.
280. In his majority opinion, Roberts does not acknowledge the specific
examples of the recent voting discrimination referenced in the congressional
reports. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2618-32. Roberts simply absolves the
cited instances for not “approaching the ‘pervasive,’ ‘flagrant,’ ‘widespread,’
and ‘rampant’ discrimination that faced Congress in 1965.” Id. at 2629 (citing
Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 308, 315, 331).
281. Following Shelby County, Eric Posner, a University of Chicago Law
professor, authored an article questioning the significance of equal state
sovereignty. Wrote Posner, “What exactly is wrong with the singling out of
states by the federal government? Is the idea that when Alabama is on the
playground with the other states, they’re going to make fun of it because it had
to ask its mama for permission before going out to play?” Eric Posner, John
Roberts’ Opinion on the Voting Rights Act is Really Lame, SLATE (June 25,
2013), www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/the_breakfast_table/features/20
13/supreme_court_2013/supreme_court_on_the_voting_rights_act_chief_justice _
john_roberts_struck.html.
282. See Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2624 (citing Northwest Austin, 557
U.S. at 211) (holding unconstitutional the VRA’s disparate treatment of states
because it “constitutes ‘extraordinary legislation otherwise unfamiliar to our
federal system’”).
283. See U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, The Clean Air Act: A
Partnership Among Governments, https://www.epa.gov/clean-air-act-overview/
clean-air-act-partnership-among-governments (last visited May 11, 2016)
(explaining, “[s]tates are responsible for developing enforceable state
implementation plans to meet the standards” established by the EPA).
284. See U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (ICE),
www.ice.gov/ero (last visited Nov. 14, 2014) (detailing that the agency operates
within Southern states removing criminal aliens and those apprehended at
the border).
285. Posner, supra note 281.

786

The John Marshall Law Review

[49:751

sovereignty were a valid constitutional principle, 286 when the
federal government is faced with exceptional circumstances
occurring in some states but not others, the federal government is
allowed to bypass equal state sovereignty. 287
As previously noted, Congress clearly and thoroughly cited its
reasons for treating the states differently when it reauthorized the
VRA in 2006. 288 Roberts overlooked the fact that states still engage
in objectionable behavior, notwithstanding the enormous strides
made since 1870. 289 If Roberts really were the impartial umpire he
said he would be during his confirmation hearings, it would have
been hard for him to miss this call. Perhaps Roberts was like Ray’s
brother-in-law in the movie Field of Dreams, unable to see the
ghosts of the past somehow still playing ball, despite the passing
of decades.290
After Shelby County, relics of the South’s voting past are
remerging. States now no longer required to seek preclearance
before their laws go into effect, have already succeeded in
effectively limiting the voting power of racial minorities. 291 The
most recent election data following the Shelby County decision, the
2014 Midterm elections, reveals record low turnouts. 292 It is clear
Congress must act to fix the damage Roberts has done.

286. Equal state sovereignty is hardly a recognized principle seeing that it
has minimal precedential support. Id. (stating “Roberts is able to cite only the
weakest support for this principle—a handful of very old cases that address
entirely different matters”).
287. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 334.
288. 2006 House Report, supra note 170; 2006 Senate Report, supra note
172.
289. See Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2629-30 (downplaying contemporary
examples of voting discrimination).
290. In the movie, Ray’s (played by Kevin Costner) brother-in-law Mark
(played by Timothy Busfield) cannot see any of the baseball players until one
of them leaves the field to save Ray’s daughter who had just fallen from the
bleachers and was choking on a hotdog. FIELD OF DREAMS (Universal Pictures
1989).
291. For example, following the Shelby County decision, the State of Texas
reenacted SB 14, an incredibly harsh voter ID law, which was previously
blocked by federal preclearance. Veasey v. Perry, 135 S. Ct. 9, 13 (2014)
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Texas v. Holder, 888 F. Supp. 2d 113, 115
(DC 2012)).
292. Midterm Elections May Have Had Record Low Turnout, NPR (Nov. 5,
2014),
www.npr.org/2014/11/05/361820838/midterm-elections-may-have-hadrecord-low-turnout (explaining that according to numbers from the Associated
Press 83 million people voted in the 2014 midterms—36.6 percent of the total
voting population—and if the national turnout rate did not reach 38.1 percent,
“it would be the lowest turnout since the midterm of elections of 1942,” which
was in the middle of WWII).
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B. Congress Can Fix This, All They
Have to Do Is Get to Work
Contrary to what the current political landscape may suggest,
Congress is certainly capable of getting things done. 293 If Congress
does act here, it would not be the first time the legislative branch
took the bite out of a holding it rightfully disagreed with. 294 It
would not even be the first time Congress did so after a VRA
ruling. 295
The Constitution’s separation of powers precludes Congress
from overriding a Supreme Court’s interpretation of a law. 296
Congress does, however, have the power to revise a law’s literal
words. 297 This is exactly what Congress did following the Court’s
Bolden holding that interpreted Section 2 of the VRA to require
plaintiffs to show the state had a discriminatory purpose or intent
when it enacted a certain voting policy. 298 Congress then literally
changed the words of Section 2 to require effects not intent. 299
Similarly, Shelby County is also quite easy to supersede.
Seeing that Roberts and four other justices remain unconvinced
that conditions occurring in or actions taken by southern states
warranted differential treatment, the new amended coverage
formula must cover all states and jurisdictions within equally. 300
Senator Patrick Leahy (D-Vt.) and Representative Terri Sewell (DAl.) have proposed identical bills titled the Voting Rights
Advancement Act of 2015 that effectively resurrect the coverage
formula . 301
293. The 113th Congress will pass the fewest amount of laws in United
States History. Cillizza, supra note 171.
294. In 1991, Congress overturned at least five 1989 Supreme Court cases
when it passed a broader Civil Rights Act. Leon Friedman, Overruling the
Court, THE AMERICAN PROSPECT (Dec. 19, 2001), http://prospect.org/article/
overruling-court (stating that the holdings “severely restricted and limited
workers’ rights under federal antidiscrimination laws,” while the law’s
preamble cited its purpose was “to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme
Court by expanding the scope of relevant civil rights statutes”).
295. Congress overrode the Court’s Bolden ruling in 1982. 1982 Senate
Report, supra note 108.
296. See generally Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (standing for the
proposition that it is the Judicial Branch’s duty to decide the constitutionality
of laws).
297. See 1982 Senate Report, supra note 108, at 2; H.R. REP. No. 97-227, at
2 (amending Section 2 of the VRA to not require discriminatory intent).
298. 1982 Senate Report, supra note 108, at 2; H.R. REP. No. 97-227, at 2.
Bolden, 446 U.S. at 74.
299. 1982 Senate Report, supra note 108, at 28 (clarifying that plaintiffs
may show a Section 2 violation by establishing discriminatory effects without
proving any kind of discriminatory intent).
300. Shelby County, 133 S. Ct. at 2630-31.
301. S. 1659, 114th Cong. (2015); H.R. 2867 114th Cong. (2015). Rep.
James Sensenbrenner Jr. (R-Wisc.) introduced a related bill, the Voting Rights
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The proposed formula found within the Act would impose
statewide preclearance for a ten-year period in any state where
“15 or more voting rights violations occurred in the State during
the previous 25 calendar years; or 10 or more voting rights
violations occurred in the State during the previous 25 years”
when the state committed at least one of the violations itself.302
The act imposes a ten-year preclearance requirement on specific
jurisdictions that had three or more violations during the previous
twenty-five calendar years. 303
This updated formula seems to right any perceived wrongs—
no matter how illogical they may have been—cited by Roberts in
his Shelby County majority opinion. The proposed Act’s formula
ensures any state that is subjected to preclearance is so classified
because of its most recent twenty-five years of political
conditions. 304 The Act also applies to every state; therefore,
Roberts’s principle of equal state sovereignty is protected. 305
Finally, the bailout option remains unchanged and still allows
states to bailout of preclearance earlier than the coverage formula
mandates. 306
Though the bill seems to satisfy Roberts’s checklist, perhaps
these Congress-people should now redirect their efforts at
appeasing those who do not see the need for a coverage formula or
preclearance. No action has been taken on the Senator Leahy’s bill
since he introduced it on June 24, 2015. Representative Sewell’s
version has remained in Subcommittee since July 9, 2015. 307 It
seems that the issue is not whether the VRA is a strike, but
instead whether the VRA is a pitch worth throwing. 308 It is up to
Amendment Act of 2015. H.R. 885, 114th Cong. (2015). Additionally, last year
Sen. Leahy and Rep. Sensenbrenner Jr. introduced similar identical bills titled
the Voting Rights Amendment Act of 2014. S. 1945, 113th Cong. (2014); H.R.
3899, 113th Cong. (2014).
302. S. 1659 §§ 4(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii); H.R. 2867 §§ 4(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii).
303. S. 1659 § 4(b)(1)(B); H.R. 2867 § 4(b)(1)(B).
304. S. 1659 § 4(b)(1); H.R. 2867 § 4(b)(1).
305. S. 1659 §§ 4(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii); H.R. 2867 §§ 4(b)(1)(A)(i)-(ii). See Shelby
County, 133 S. Ct. at 2624 (asserting “the fundamental principle of equal
sovereignty [is] highly pertinent”).
306. S. 1659 § 4(b)(1); H.R. 2867 § 4(b)(1).
307. All Actions S. 1659—114th Congress (2015-2016), CONGRESS .GOV ,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/senate-bill/1659/all-actions
(last
visited Apr. 28 2016); All Actions H.R. 2867—114th Congress (2015-2016),
CONGRESS .GOV ,
www.congress.gov/bill/114th-congress/house-bill/2867/allactions (last visited Apr. 28, 2016).
308. GovTrack.us predicts that each bill has a 1 percent chance of being
enacted. H.R. 2867: Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2015, G OV TRACK.US ,
www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr2867 (last visited Apr. 28, 2016);
S. 1659: Voting Rights Advancement Act of 2015, G OV TRACK.US , www.gov
track.us/congress/bills/114/s1659 (last visited Apr. 28, 2016). GovTrack.us
employs logistic regression that incorporates factors that correlate with
successful or failed bills in the past to predict a bill’s chances on becoming
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those who are not blinded by our nation’s enormous strides to
convince others that there is still more work to be done. The right
to vote is too precious of a right; the unrelenting efforts of those
before us cannot be replaced by naïve content.

V. CONCLUSION
John Roberts is not the umpire he said he would be. His
Shelby County opinion resurrects his pre–chief justice opinions of
the Voting Rights Act. By manipulating precedent, Roberts made
his personal agenda the law of the land. His opinion callously
champions the right of every state to be treated equally by the
federal government rather than protecting the right of every
person to have equal access to the polls. Still, Congress has the
ability to rectify the situation. The true question is whether it will
choose to do so.

Law. Analysis Methodology, G OV TRACK.US, www.govtrack.us/about/analysis
#prognosis (last visited Apr. 28 2016).

790

The John Marshall Law Review

[49:751

